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INTEREST OF AMICI 
  Amici’s sole interest in this case is the proper devel-
opment and application of patent law to promote innova-
tion and competition.1 Amici teach and write about patent 
law; all also have patent law experience. This brief is 
submitted to provide the Court with scholarly assistance 
informed by experience. 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
  Inventors lacking assurance of a market, or even the 
right to practice patented inventions, face considerable 
risk. Those who qualify for patents, in return for disclo-
sure, receive only the assistance of the courts in excluding 
others from economic exploitation of their inventions. 
Already subject to many legislative and judicial limita-
tions, patents should not be further subject to the func-
tional equivalent of private inverse condemnation without 
congressional action. 
  Precedents of this Court hold that patentees forfeit no 
rights for nonuse as such and that private parties are not 
ordinarily free to practice protected inventions upon 
payment of a judicially-determined royalty. Indeed, in rare 
instances where Congress authorizes public taking, the 
executive branch hesitates for fear of deterring socially 
and economically important innovation.  
 
  1 Pursuant to Sup. Ct. R. 37.6, the amici represent that they have 
authored this brief in whole; no person or entity other than Franklin 
Pierce Law Center has made any monetary contribution to its prepara-
tion or submission. On December 10, 2005, counsel for the respective 
parties consented by email to the filing of this brief. 
2 
  The trial court accepted arguments analogous, given 
the apparent economic disparity between the parties, to 
ones Goliath might have made in asking that David be 
disarmed. It failed to cite the most relevant precedent 
when refusing an injunction to a party actively seeking to 
exploit its patents. Nor did the trial court identify a public 
interest that might, despite precedent, warrant such 
refusal. 
  An appellate court does not overreach in reversing 
decisions unsupported by facts, law or sound reasons. 
Failure to recite that proposition does not warrant rever-
sal of the decision below. 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. Patent Rights Are Conditional And Limited. 
A. Patents Represent A Bargain With The 
United States Government. 
  To obtain patents, applicants must satisfy the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) that inventions for 
which protection is sought are useful, novel and nonobvi-
ous. 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 102 (2001) and 103 (Supp. 2005). 
Applicants must also disclose the best mode of practicing 
their inventions so that others may practice them upon 
expiration of their patents. 35 U.S.C.A. § 112 (2001). 
  Utility, novelty and nonobviousness are conditions for 
patent grants, but disclosure is the applicants’ quid pro 
quo for a “carefully crafted bargain.” Bonito Boats, Inc. v. 
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989); 
Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998). In 
return, owners are normally entitled to the aid of federal 
3 
courts in excluding others from, e.g., making, using or 
selling subject matter described in allowed claims. 35 
U.S.C.A. §§ 154(a)(1), 271 (2001); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1338 
(Supp. 2005). 
 
B. Patents Are Subject To Many Legislative 
And Judicial Limitations. 
  First, patent owners are permitted to do nothing, 
Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1880), except 
exclude others from practicing inventions encompassed 
literally, or, rarely, by equivalence, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 726 
(2002), within the scope of claims negotiated with the 
PTO. 
  Second, patentees are strictly liable for information 
available when claimed inventions were made. Rights are 
subject to loss regardless of whether applicants were, or 
reasonably could have been, expected to know of applica-
ble prior art. 35 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (includes foreign publi-
cations). A priori, applicants unaware of the market for 
inventions have less incentive to scour the literature for 
potentially fatal art than infringers subsequently aware of 
the stakes. 
  Third, applicants’ lack of candor during PTO examina-
tion may render otherwise valid rights unenforceable. 
McPherson’s Ltd. v. Never Dull, Inc., 960 F.2d 156 (Table), 
1992 WL 52140 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
  Fourth, patents, when granted, may be subject to 
statutory compulsory licenses. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 7608 
(2003) (Clean Air Act) and 35 U.S.C.A. § 203 (Supp. 2005) 
(federally-funded inventions); see also, 35 U.S.C.A. § 209 
4 
(2001 & Supp. 2005) (termination of exclusive license on 
federally-owned inventions).  
  Fifth, patent misuse may result in forfeiture of all 
rights. Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 
(1942) (conditioning patent use on purchase of unpatented 
supplies); Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964) (condi-
tioning use on agreement to pay royalties beyond patent 
term). In apparently less egregious circumstances, patent-
ees may be obligated only to license others. United States 
v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 59 (1973) (compulsory 
licensing is a “well established form[ ] of relief when 
necessary to an effective remedy, particularly where 
patents have provided the leverage for or have contributed 
to the antitrust violation adjudicated.”). 
  Sixth, patents are subject to public inverse condemna-
tion. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1498 (Supp. 2005) (limits relief against 
the federal government to suits for damages in the U.S. 
Court of Federal Claims); see also College Savings Bank v. 
Florida Prepaid Educational Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 627 
(1999) (federal suits against states based on the Patent Act 
are barred by the 11th Amendment). 
  Last, patentees have also, if rarely, been subject to 
private inverse condemnation.2 City of Milwaukee v. 
Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577, 593 (7th Cir. 1934) 
(court refused to shut down an infringing city-owned waste 
treatment plant); Cf. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 
 
  2 Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 146 
F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1945) is oft cited for the same proposition, but, at 146 
F.2d 946-47, the opinion states: “Since our consideration of the record 
convinces us that the patents are invalid, we have concluded that 
equity will best be served by disposing of the case on that ground.” 
Moreover, patentee was faulted for egregious misconduct, 146 F.2d 946. 
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N.Y.2d 219, 225 n.*, 228 (App. Div. 1970) (a $45 million 
cement plant employing 300 people was found to be a 
nuisance, but the court awarded permanent damages, 
thereby imposing a servitude on plaintiffs’ land). 
 
II. Precedent, Coupled With Evidence Of Legisla-
tive And Executive Choices, Counsels Against 
Ordinarily Obligating Patent Owners To Li-
cense Other Than Through Arms-Length Bar-
gaining. 
A. Paper Bag Held That Patent Holders’ Obli-
gations To Use Protected Inventions Is 
Principally For Congress To Determine. 
  Defendant, in Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern 
Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908), argued that plaintiff ’s 
unexplained nonuse of patented technology warranted 
denial of an injunction. Before addressing that question 
however, the Court chose first to consider the rights 
conferred, 210 U.S. at 423. On that point, the opinion 
quotes United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 167 
U.S. 249, 250 (1897), where the Court had rejected a 
similar argument:  
Counsel seem to argue that one who has made an 
invention and thereupon applies for a patent 
therefor occupies, as it were, the position of a 
quasi trustee for the public; that he is under a 
sort of moral obligation to see that the public ac-
quires the right to the free use of that invention 
as soon as is conveniently possible. We dissent 
entirely from the thought thus urged. The inven-
tor is one who has discovered something of value. 
It is his absolute property. He may withhold the 
knowledge of it from the public, and he may in-
sist upon all the advantages and benefits which 
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the statute promises to him who discloses to the 
public his invention. 
Paper Bag, 210 U.S. at 424. 
  Although the circuit court had apparently inferred an 
improper motive from the patentee’s nonuse, the Court 
wrote:  
[I]t is certainly disputable that the nonuse was 
unreasonable. . . . There was no question of a di-
minished supply of or increase of prices, and can 
it be said, as a matter of law, that a nonuse was 
unreasonable which had for its motive the saving 
of the expense that would have been involved by 
changing the equipment of a factory from one set 
of machines to another? And even if the old ma-
chines could have been altered, the expense 
would have been considerable. 
Id. at 429. The Court thus held:  
As to the suggestion that competitors were ex-
cluded from the use of the new patent, we answer 
that such exclusion may be said to have been of 
the very essence of the right conferred by the 
patent, as it is the privilege of any owner of 
property to use or not use it, without question of 
motive. 
Id. 
  That decision was largely predicated on deference to 
evidence of congressional choices. The Court pointed out 
that Congress had not overlooked patentees’ nonuse. It 
had been aware of hostility toward nonuse abroad and, 
indeed, had briefly imposed forfeiture for aliens’ nonuse. 
But Congress no longer required use by alien, much less 
domestic, patentees. Although the opinion ends with 
7 
recognition that “a court of equity might be justified in 
withholding relief by injunction,” 210 U.S. at 429, it does 
not elaborate. 
 
B. Coe Confirmed That The Consequences Of 
Nonuse Are Principally For Congress To 
Determine. 
  In Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370 (1945), 
the court of appeals had upheld a refusal to grant a patent 
“upon the ground that petitioner did not intend to make or 
use the invention. . . . ” Id. at 371. The Court reversed, 
however, stating: “[T]he court below assumed that such 
purpose . . . would invalidate the patent because it would 
be contrary to the constitutional purpose and to the spirit 
if not the letter of the patent laws. We think both assump-
tions are unwarranted.” Id. at 377. 
  The Court went on to say: “This Court has consis-
tently held that failure of the patentee to make use of a 
patented invention does not affect the validity of the 
patent.” Id. at 378-79. Once again, it observed: “Congress 
has frequently been asked to change the policy of the 
statutes as interpreted by this Court by imposing a forfei-
ture or providing for compulsory licensing if the patent is 
not used within a specified time, but has not done so.” Id. 
at 379 (notes omitted). Yet, the opinion further states: “The 
record establishes no intention by petitioner not to use his 
invention, and no proposed use of it disclosed or suggested 
by the record affords any basis for withholding the grant of 
the patent.” Id. at 380. 
  Justice Douglas, joined by two others, urged that the 
patent legislation interpreted in light of the Constitution 
supported an obligation to use. Id. at 380 (Douglas, J., 
8 
dissenting). His opinion cites a 1941 report for the proposi-
tion that nonuse and related “maneuvers retard, rather 
than promote, the progress of the useful arts.” Id. at 382. 
He went on to consider “an invention or discovery which 
unlocks the doors of science and reveals the secrets of a 
dread disease. Is it possible that a patentee could be 
permitted to suppress that invention for seventeen years 
(the term of the letters patent) and withhold from human-
ity the benefits of the cure?” Id. at 383. As addressed 
above, however, that hypothetical outcome is not only 
unlikely,3 but also has no bearing on the present case.4 
 
C. Dawson Confirmed That Circumstances 
Warranting Compulsory Licenses Are Prin-
cipally For Congress To Determine. 
  Whereas Coe considered nonuse but not compulsory 
licensing, Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 
448 U.S. 176 (1980), considered the converse situation. 
Rohm and Haas was indeed using its patent – one that 
claimed the sole known use of an unclaimed product. 
Because the doctrine of contributory infringement re-
flected in 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) precluded Dawson from using 
an unpatented product, it argued that a license should be 
compelled. The Court disagreed. Once again reflecting 
deference to Congress, the opinion states: “Compulsory 
 
  3 See supra note 2. 
  4 Justice Rutledge, however, maintained that the record did not 
support a need to address “the interesting and important questions 
debated by the Court’s opinion and my dissenting brethren.” Coe, 324 
U.S. at 384 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). The rejected claims might well 
have encompassed terrain captured within the doctrine of equivalents, 
but he would have affirmed the administrative conclusion that the 
proffered claims were not literally supported by the specification. 
9 
licensing is a rarity in our patent system, and we decline 
to manufacture such a requirement,” id. at 215. 
  Most significantly in the context of the present dis-
pute, note 21, appended to the just-quoted language, 
states: “Compulsory licensing of patents often has been 
proposed, but it has never been enacted on a broad scale. 
Although compulsory licensing provisions were considered 
for possible incorporation into the 1952 revision of the 
patent laws, they were dropped before the final bill was 
circulated.” Id., n.21. 
 
D. Reluctant To Deter Innovation, The Execu-
tive Branch Is Unwilling To Circumvent 
Patents Despite Short-Term Need And Un-
ambiguous Authority. 
  Nonuse is akin to suboptimal use of patents. In 2001, 
following the anthrax scare, the Bush Administration 
threatened to compromise exclusivity for the drug Cipro 
when it appeared more would be needed than Bayer could 
produce.5 Threats apparently were adequate to address 
public health concerns, but they generated unintended 
consequences insofar as other countries had been previ-
ously lobbied to reduce or eliminate compulsory licensing.6 
Perhaps as a result, the Bush Administration is now 
 
  5 See, e.g., Erika Mullenbach, The Influence of Disease on the 
Evolution of U.S. Patent Law and Policy Towards Foreign Patent Laws 
in the Late Twentieth to Early Twenty-First Century, 7 TUL. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 227, 239-41 (2005). 
  6 Id. at 232. 
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apparently reluctant, despite considerable pressure, to 
compel Roche to license Tamiflu.7 
  The reason, of course, is that the Administration is 
subject to even more counter pressure. One might think 
that firms holding exclusive rights, if assured of a reason-
able return on investment, would be little affected by 
having others help meet public needs, but that is not true. 
The reasons are complex and go well beyond the objections 
expressed by the petitioners (and the dissenters) in Kelo v. 
City of New London, Connecticut, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005). 
  For example, in Fromson v. Western Litho Plate and 
Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1988), Judge 
Markey wrote: “Determining a fair and reasonable royalty 
is often . . . a difficult judicial chore, seeming often to 
involve more the talents of a conjurer than those of a 
judge.” Risk of error is unavoidable for prior infringement, 
but injunctions eliminate it for future infringement. 
  Thus, the Federal Trade Commission, in To Promote 
Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent 
Law and Policy (2003), recently noted, e.g., Ch. 2 at 32 and 
Ch. 3 at 38, concern about non-practicing entities. The 
FTC did not recommend a solution and certainly did not 
recommend that all non-practicing patentees be limited to 
only legal remedies, much less regardless of pursuit of 
arms-length licenses. Had it done so, however, surely its 
recommendation would have been addressed to Congress, 
not the courts. 
 
  7 See, e.g., House Democrats Press for Compulsory Licensing 
Authority, FDA WEEK, Nov. 11, 2005, 2005 WLNR 18263219. 
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III. The Decision Below Properly Rejected The 
District Court’s Reasons For Denying Equita-
ble Relief To MercExchange. 
A. The District Court Did Not Apply Proper 
Precedent. 
  In MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 275 F.Supp.2d 
695 (E.D. Va. 2003), a jury returned a verdict finding 
defendants liable for $35 million for willfully infringing 
MercExchange’s patents. Id. at 698. After referring to the 
court’s authority to issue injunctions under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 283, the court states: “[T]he grant of injunctive relief 
against the infringer is considered the norm; however, the 
decision to grant or deny injunctive relief remains within 
the discretion of the trial judge.” Id. at 711. It also notes 
the four factors that have traditionally informed courts’ 
discretion before explaining their applicability in this case. 
Id.  
  Yet, in ultimately refusing injunctive relief, that court 
failed to cite, much less distinguish, Paper Bag. Its failure 
is remarkable because, in explaining why plaintiff is not 
irreparably harmed, the opinion stresses that “plaintiff 
does not practice its inventions and exists merely to 
license its patented technology to others.” Id. at 712. 
  Rather, the trial court relied heavily on Foster v. 
American Machine & Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir. 
1974) in limiting MercExchange to its legal remedy. eBay, 
275 F.Supp.2d at 713. Foster, too, failed to cite Paper Bag 
in concluding: “To grant [the patentee] a compulsory 
royalty is to give him half a loaf. In the circumstance of his 
utter failure to exploit the patent on his own, that seems 
fair.” Foster, 492 F.2d at 1324. That is difficult to fathom 
when that language squarely addresses the central issue 
12 
in Paper Bag. In any event, it is starkly at odds with the 
holding of the most relevant precedent. 
  The district court also relied principally on Foster with 
regard to the balance of hardships when it wrote: “Any 
harm suffered by the plaintiff, by the defendants’ in-
fringement of the patents, can be recovered by way of 
damages.” eBay, 275 F.Supp.2d at 714. Thus, three of the 
factors relevant to equitable relief seem ultimately to have 
collapsed into one. 
  With regard to public interest, the fourth factor, the 
district court did not suggest that MercExchange had 
misused its patents or that its right to injunctive relief 
was otherwise compromised by anything discussed above.8 
Nor does its opinion suggest that MercExchange should be 
subject to the functional equivalent of private inverse 
condemnation to reduce or avoid serious public health 
risks. 
  On the contrary, the court concluded: “[T]he public 
interest factor equally supports granting an injunction to 
protect the plaintiff ’s patent rights, and denying an 
injunction to protect the public’s interest in using a pat-
ented business-method that the patent holder declines to 
practice.” Id. at 714. Its explanation credits the impor-
tance of injunctions in encouraging activities supported by 
patent grants but again relies on patentee’s nonuse. 
Moreover, with no credible support, that explanation 
suggests that owners of so-far unlicensed business-method 
patents would never be entitled to injunctions. Id. at 713. 
 
  8 Supra Part I.B. 
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That qualifies more as a legislative judgment than as an 
ad hoc exercise of equitable discretion. 
 
B. The Decision Below Applied The Correct 
Standard Of Review For Injunctions De-
spite Failure To Recite It Explicitly. 
  In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 
U.S. 402, 416 (1971), the Court held that the standard of 
review for abuse of discretion is narrow, but that decisions, 
to be upheld, must be based on a consideration of relevant 
factors and not evidence a clear error of judgment. Many 
decisions show that the Federal Circuit applies this 
standard correctly. 
  Thus, Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 849 F.2d 
1446, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1988), upheld denial, on public 
interest grounds, of a preliminary patent injunction 
against potentially infringing hepatitis and cancer test 
kits. Likewise, High Tech Medical Instrumentation, Inc. v. 
New Image Industries, Inc., 49 F.3d 1551, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 
1995), upheld denial of a preliminary patent injunction 
based on, for example, delay and weak evidence of likely 
success on the merits, particularly absent evidence of 
harm pendente lite. Most recently, the court, in Fuji Photo 
Film Co., Ltd. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368, 1380 
(Fed. Cir. 2005), upheld denial of a permanent patent 
injunction subsumed by relief already provided in a 
related proceeding before the International Trade Com-
mission.9 
 
  9 Jazz Photo Corp. v. U.S., 353 F.Supp.2d 1327 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
2004); see also Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 
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  In the case on review, however, as discussed above, 
the trial court ignored the most relevant precedent and, 
sua sponte, applied a rule prejudicial to a whole class of 
patent owners. eBay, 275 F.Supp.2d at 713. It also applied 
High Tech Med. Instrumentation without considering 
critical differences between withholding preliminary and 
permanent relief,10 or factoring in that the jury found that 
eBay had not only infringed but had done so willfully. Id. 
at 712. In such circumstances, reversal, even under the 
abuse of discretion standard, should not require protracted 
formal discussion. 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
CONCLUSION 
  Absent congressional action, owners should be further 
obligated neither to use nor to permit other private parties 
to engage in activities forbidden by 35 U.S.C. § 271. For 
that and other foregoing reasons, the judgment below 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
THOMAS G. FIELD, JR. 
Professor of Law 
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1110-11 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (disapproving ITC’s exclusion of refurbished 
cameras originally purchased in the United States). 
  10 See, e.g., DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES, 445 
(3d Ed. 2002) (“Courts at the preliminary relief stage routinely find no 
irreparable injury in injuries they would find irreparable after a full trial.”). 
